Jury selection and jury trial in Spain: between theory and practice by Jimeno Bulnes, Mar
Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 86
Issue 2 Symposium on Comparative Jury Systems Article 7
April 2011
Jury Selection and Jury Trial in Spain: Between
Theory and Practice
Mar Jimeno-Bulnes
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please
contact dginsberg@kentlaw.iit.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mar Jimeno-Bulnes, Jury Selection and Jury Trial in Spain: Between Theory and Practice, 86 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 585 (2011).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol86/iss2/7
JURY SELECTION AND JURY TRIAL IN SPAIN:
BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE
MAR JIMENO-BULNES*
INTRODUCTION
Spain has adopted the classic system of trial by jury, as opposed to the
European-particularly the French-model that consists of a mixed court
of professional judges and lay assessors.I Constitutional provisions on the
subject of lay participation, under Article 125, were formulated almost
twenty years ago, after the approval of the Spanish Constitution, in the Ley
Orgd6nica del Tribunal del Jurado (L.O.T.J.), the Spanish Jury Law. 2 Nev-
ertheless, certain features of the jury system in Spain are to some extent
unique, such as the selection process and the proceedings in the jury court.
Most of the jury systems' peculiarities concern the verdict phase. Under
Spanish legislation, the jury's verdict must be decided by majority rule3
and, perhaps more unusually, it must also be "reasoned" in a similar way to
* Full Professor of Procedural Law at the University of Burgos, Spain, and Temporary Magi-
strate at the Provincial Court in Burgos. Address for correspondence: Mjimeno@ubu.es. The author is
grateful to Antony Ross Price for his revision of the English, as well as to Jos6 Luis Gallo Hidalgo,
Clerk of the Provincial Court of Burgos, and other employees of the Justice Administration in Section
1, Criminal Division, for their kind assistance.
1. See generally Francois Gorphe, Reforms of the Jury-System in Europe: France and Other
Continental Countries, 27 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 155 (1936). In contrast, for a general view of
the jury in common law countries, see Symposium, The Common Law Jury, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Spring 1999, at 1, and WORLD JURY SYSTEMS (Neil Vidmar ed., 2000). For a general global approach,
see Symposium, Lejury dans le procks penal au KYI& si&cle [Lay Participation in the Criminal Trial in
the 21st Century], 72 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PENAL 1 (2001) (Fr.). And for a discussion of
the United States jury system, see Symposium: The Jury at a Crossroad: The American Experience, 18
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 907 (2003), and NANCY S. MARDER, THE JURY PROCESS (2005).
2. The L.O.T.J. has been in force since November 24, 1995, and has been amended twice by
Organic Law 8/1995 (November 16th), B.O.E. 1995, 275, and Organic Law 10/1995 (November 23rd),
B.O.E. 1995, 281, of the Criminal Code. Juan Alberto Belloch, the Minister of Justice at that time in the
Socialist Government of Felipe GonzAlez, saw the traditional jury model as a personal challenge. Many
commentators supported Belloch's preference of a mixed-court model, such as prestigious professors
Victor Fairin Guillin, Vicente Gimeno Sendra, Jos6 Martin Ostos, Ernesto Pedraz Penalva (who wrote
on whether the jury court is necessary at all!), and Agustin-Jesius Prez-Cruz Martin. For a list of sever-
al works by these professors, see Mar Jimeno-Bulnes, Lay Participation in Spain: The Jury System, 14
INT'L CRIM. JUST. REV. 164, 181-85 (2004). See also Stephen C. Thaman, Spain Returns to Trial by
Jury, 21 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 241, 253 (1998) (considering the mixed court to be the best
solution for Spain).
3. L.O.T.J. art. 59(1).
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the judicial decision itself, albeit expressed in the language of the layper-
son. 4
In relation to the Spanish jury, there is significant literature in English
discussing special features in the Spanish legislation as well as the great
controversy over the selection procedures under the L.O.T.J. in the applica-
tion of constitutional provisions.5 The debate over the appropriateness of
the classical jury pattern in a civil law system did nothing to stop the
enactment of the L.O.T.J. in Spain, nor was the L.O.T.J.'s enactment de-
railed by the existing lay participation in the administration of justice. 6 The
literal wording of Article 125 of the Spanish Constitution contemplates the
right to become a juror, rather than framing jury service in terms of a man-
datory duty: "citizens may engage in popular action and take part in the
administration of justice through the institution of the jury, in the manner
and with respect to those criminal trials as may be determined by law."7
4. L.O.T.J. art. 61(l)(d) (requiring "a succinct explanation of the reasons why the members of
the jury have declared, or refused to declare, certain facts as having been proved" to be one of the
contents of the verdict form); see also Mar Jimeno-Bulnes, A Different Story Line for 12 Angry Men:
Verdicts Reached by Majority Rule-The Spanish Perspective, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 759 (2007). For a
comparative view of Spanish and U.S. legislation, see ENRIQUE VtLEZ RODRIGUEZ, LA
MOTIVACI6N Y RACIONALIDAD DEL VEREDICTO EN EL DERECHO ESPANOL Y EN EL
DERECHO NORTEAMERICANO (2006).
5. See Jimeno-Bulnes, supra note 2, at 169-72. For a longer Spanish version on the issue, see
Mar Jimeno-Bulnes, La participacidn popular en la administracidn de la justicia mediante el jurado
(Art. 125 CE), 2 DOCUMENTOS PENALES Y CRIMINOL6GICOS 297 (2004). Also, for an article on the
history of the Spanish jury, see CARMEN GLEADOW, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY IN THE SPANISH
LEGAL SYSTEM (2000), as well as relevant literature such as Thaman, supra note 2. For a selection of
Spanish and Latin-American bibliographies providing comparative views of jury proceedings in differ-
ent Spanish-speaking countries, see generally JUICIO POR JURADOS EN EL PROCESO PENAL (Julio B. J.
Maier et al. eds., 2000), with contributions by Ernesto Pedraz Penalva at 239-333 and Agustin-Jestis
Pdrez-Cruz Martin at 335-388.
6. See Perfecto Andrds Ib~fiez, PROLOGO: JURADO: EL DEBATE DEBE CONTINUAR, in
ALBERTO JORGE BARREIRO ET AL., JUICIO POR JURADO: CUESTIONES TEORICAS Y
PRACTICAS (PRUEBA. VEREDICTO. SENTENCIA. RECURSOS) 11, 17 (2004).
7. CONSTITUCION ESPA&OLA [C.E.], B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978 (Spain), available at
http://www.congreso.es/constitucion/ficheros/c78/consIingl.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2011). Hence,
"nobody can think that a jury is obligatory" according to ERNESTO PEDRAZ PENALVA, Sobre el signifi-
cado y vigencia del Jurado, in CONsTITUCI6N, JURISDIcCI6N Y PROCESO 59, 65 (1990). As stated, the
author is very critical of the jury institution and its social legitimacy. See, e.g., Ernesto Pedraz Penalva,
Notas sobre el jurado que viene, REVISTA DEL ILUSTRE COLEGIO DE ABOGADOS DEL SE&ORIO DE
VIZCAYA, Jan./Mar. 1996, at 74; Ernesto Pedraz Penalva, EL JURADO COMO VIA DE
PARTICIPACI6N POPULAR, 2 LA LEY 1006, 1007 (1994). In contrast, other authors at the time
argued that Article 125 established "a constitutional mandate of obligatory nature." See, e.g., RAMON
SORIANO, EL NUEVO JURADO ESPA&OL 129 (1985); Ramon Soriano, EL DERECHO A LA JUSTICIA
POPULAR: EL NUEVO JURADO ESPAR OL, 1 LA LEY 1024, 1031 (1985); Jose Vicente Gimeno
Sendra, El articulo 125 de la Constitucian, los Tribunales de Jurado y de escabinos, REVISTA
GENERAL DE LEGISLACI6N Y JURISPRUDENCIA, Oct. 1981, at 343, 345. Also, the Minister of
Justice, who promoted the introduction of the jury system in Spain, Juan Alberto Belloch Julbe, LA LEY
DEL JURADO, 12 REVISTA VASCA DE DERECHO PROCESAL Y ARBITRAJE 323, 323 (2000).
586 [Vol 86:2
JURY SELECTION AND JURY TRIAL IN SPAIN
Thus, Article 125 permits, but does not require, the legislature to regulate
the jury within the criminal process.
Legislative regulation of this constitutional provision came in the form
of the L.O.T.J. in 1995, but the purpose of this Article is not to revive the
debate over its introduction. Instead, the time is ripe for an evaluation of
the Spanish experience in terms of theory and practice8 in order to verify
adherence with the law from both an institutional and procedural perspec-
tive. First, in relation to the institutional perspective, this Article will re-
view the fulfillment of the "duty/right" 9 of Spanish citizens, insofar as the
task to participate in the administration of justice is remunerated yet com-
pulsory. The second perspective concerns procedural aspects, and here, the
legal gap between theory and practice is due to several circumstances, such
as areas outside the competence of jury courts,10 the assignment of cases to
professional judges, as well as plea bargaining between the accused and the
prosecution when, in the best judgment of the magistrate-president of the
Jury Court, the case is cut and dry. This cut and dry assessment puts an
abrupt end to the criminal proceeding even before the selection of the jury
panel.
We begin by examining the role of the Spanish Jury Court, both in
theory and in practice, from an institutional and a procedural perspective.
I. JURY SELECTION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: EXCUSES AND
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION
In Spain, nine citizens constitute a jury that is presided over by a Pro-
vincial Court magistrate. All jurors participate in the tasks of the jury
8. See JUICIO POR JURADO: EXPERIENCIA Y REVISION (Enrique Bacigalupo Zapater &
Miguel Carmona Ruano eds., 2007); Jost CANO BARRERO, LA LEY DEL JURADO. JURISPRUDENCIA
COMENTADA. DIEZ AfROS DE APLICACION DE LA LEY DEL JURADO (2007). Also, for an interesting and
systematic approach, see MAGDALENA GONZALEZ JIMtNEZ, LA INSTITUCION DEL JURADO: LA
EXPERIENCIA ESPA&OLA (2006).
9. L.O.T.J. art. 6 ("La funci6n de jurado es un derecho ejercitable por aquellos ciudadanos en los
que no concurra motivo que lo impida y su desempeflo un deber para quienes no estdn incursos en causa
de incompatibilidad o prohibici6n ni puedan excusarse conforme a esta Ley." [Jury service is a right
that may be exercised by all citizens for whom there is no reason that might prevent them and its per-
formance is a duty for whoever is not subject to any incompatibility or ban or who is unable to excuse
themselves in accordance with this law.]).
10. The jury court is the lawful court, according to Article 24(2) of the Spanish Constitution, for
certain offenses that are legally prescribed in Article 1(2) of the L.O.T.J. Thus, these provisions that
specify the right to trial by jury are unlike those in common law countries, the most representative
guarantees for which are the procedural guarantees provided under the Sixth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution or the Jury Waiver in Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. For a com-
parative view between the systems in Spain and the United States, see BEATRIZ SANJURJO REBOLLO,
Los JURADOS EN USA Y EN ESPAlRA: DOS CONTENIDOS DISTINTOS DE UNA MISMA EXPRESI6N 173-74,
318-19 (2004).
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throughout the trial: they reach a verdict in light of which the magistrate-
president pronounces judgment and, when necessary, imposes a sentence.II
However, one of the most controversial jury issues centers on the precise
way in which the right to trial by jury is regulated in the L.O.T.J., which
establishes lay participation in a jury in terms of a "duty/right" in a very
particular way.12 Insofar as it is a right, the law offers remunerationl3; in-
asmuch as it is a duty, the law also contemplates certain sanctions for fail-
ure to participate as a juror in the tasks given by the magistrate-president.14
Moreover, the most controversial aspect of this duty to act as juror is
the absence of any regulation that refers to conscientious objection.' 5 In-
itially, the Constitutional Court appeared to look favorably on conscien-
tious objection, allowing the complainant the possibility of lodging an
11. See L.O.T.J. arts. 2-4. Among the works in Spanish, see basic remarks by Juan-Luis Gomez
Colomer, EL JURADO ESPANOL: LEY Y PRACTICA, 72 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PENAL
285 (2001), and, more extensively, JUAN-LUIs G6MEZ COLOMER, EL PROCESO PENAL ESPECIAL ANTE
EL TRIBUNAL DEL JURADO (1996) [hereinafter G6MEZ COLOMER, EL PROCESO PENAL ESPECIAL].
Specifically, regarding the composition of the Jury Court, see Agustin-Jesds Prez-Cruz Martin,
ANOTACIONES A LA COMPETENCIA Y COMPOSICI6N DEL TRIBUNAL DEL JURADO.
ESPECIAL CONSIDERACIN DE LOS ARTS. 1 A 5 DE LA L.O. 5/1995, <<IN DATADA)), 95 JUSTICIA
63 (1995), as well as Juliin Sdnchez Melgar, CONSTITUCI6N DEL TRIBUNAL DEL JURADO, I LA
LEY 1616 (1996).
12. See supra note 9 and accompanying text; see also Gdran Rollnert Liem, El derecho-deber de
participar en la Administracidn de Justicia (Ley Orgdnica 5/1995, de 23 de mayo, del Tribunal del
Jurado): su problematica constitucional, 616-17 REVISTA GENERAL DEL DERECHO 221 (1996); Juan
Luis G6mez-Colomer, Aproximacidn al Estatuto Juridico de los Jueces Legos en el Proyecto de Ley del
Jurado, ACTUALIDAD JURIDICA ARANZADI, Apr. 13, 1995, at 1; Antonio Gilbert, La Obligatoriedad de
lafuncidn del jurado, 15 PODER JUDICIAL 35 (1985). For a more recent approach, see ANTONIO MARIA
LORCA NAVARRETE, JURADOS: LA CAPACIDAD, INCAPACIDAD, INCOMPATIBILIDAD,
PROHIBICION Y EXCUSA PARA ACTUAR COMO JURADO. LA GARANTIA DE LA
DESIGNACION DE LOS CANDIDATOS A JURADOS Y DE LA COMPOSICION DEL
TRIBUNAL DEL JURADO. SANCIONES POR NO ACTUAR COMO JURADO. LA GARANTIA
DE LA FUNCl6N DE LOS JURADOS (2009).
13. The Resolution of July 21, 2006, by the Assistant Secretary of the Presidency authorizes a
daily payment of E67 for each juror and E33.50 for each prospective juror, as well as a travel allowance
(£0.19/km by car), lodging (£65.97, breakfast included), and a food stipend of £18.70 (lunch and even-
ing meal). B.O.E. 2006, 177.
14. According to Article 39(2) of the L.O.T.J., fines amount to £150 if a person summoned to do
jury service fails to appear in court without any justification after the first summons, and fines amount
to between £600 to £1,500 if that person fails to appear after the second summons. Further penalties are
contemplated in other situations, such as the refusal to take the imperative oath or promise according to
Article 41(4) of the L.O.T.J., in which case the penalty rises to £300. The highest penalties are imposed
on jurors who fail to take part in the verdict-voting and register an abstention; according to Article 58(2)
of the L.O.T.J., a penalty of £450 may be imposed by the magistrate-president, who will advise over
criminal liability ensuing from persistent abstention. On these administrative and criminal penalties, see
especially LORCA NAVARRETE, supra, note 12, at 186-97, and on criminal liability, see ANTONI
LLABRtS FUSTER & CARMEN TOMAS-VALIENTE LANUZA, LA RESPONSABILIDAD PENAL DEL MIEMBRO
DEL JURADO (1998).
15. See Juan Manual Bermiidez Requena, La Objecian de Conciencia y el Jurado, 27
ACTUALIDAD PENAL 489 (1998); Javier Martinez-Torron, LEY DEL JURADO Y OBJECI6N DE
CONCIENCIA, 48 REVISTA ESPA&OLA DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL 119 (1996).
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appeal of last resort or a "defense appeal" (recurso de amparo) on the
grounds of a breach of fundamental rights. In the only decision on this is-
sue, the Constitutional Court declared that it was "too soon" to evaluate a
possible breach of the fundamental right to conscientious objection, be-
cause an opportunity to allege the legal causes of qualification had yet to
arrive.16 Consequently, given the lack of guidance from the Constitutional
Court on the merits of conscientious objection, it remains unclear whether
it should in theory have any legal weight. In judicial practice, however,
conscientious objections operate as one sort of excuse, as will be shown
below. First, however, some references to legal rules should be mentioned
in relation to the juridical status of Spanish jurors and the jury selection
process.
A. Legal Status ofJurors in the L.O.TJ.: Causes for Qualification and
Disqualification
With regard to the legal status of Spanish jurors, the L.O.T.J. estab-
lishes a complicated system of causes for their qualification and disqualifi-
cation, 17 involving more than just one category in the latter case. In relation
to the legal conditions for Spanish citizens to qualify for jury service, Ar-
ticle 8 lists five points: jurors must be over eighteen years of age' 8; possess
the right to vote; have the ability to read and write; reside in any part of the
province in which the offense was committed; and lack physical, mental, or
sensory disability that would prevent them from acting as jurors. Four
points are listed as causes for disqualification, each of them with different
headings that contemplate various personal and professional circumstances:
(1) Incapacities: These circumstances, described in Article 9, provide
for the traditional causes for disqualification: a person involved in criminal
proceedings, held on remand or serving a prison sentence, with a criminal
conviction, or temporarily suspended from public office pending criminal
proceedings.
16. S.T.C., Nov. 29, 1999 (R.G.D., No. 216). In this case, the defense lodged an appeal against the
decision of the senior judge, which rejected the removal of the complainant from a list of prospective
jurors. The Constitutional Court's decision declared that the complaint was still "premature" inasmuch
as any violation of the plaintiffs rights had not yet taken place because at that moment he was still a
prospective juror and had not taken the oath as a juror in a specific criminal trial.
17. See G6mez Colomer, supra note 12; LORCA NAVARRETE, supra note 12, at 29.
18. For a discussion on this minimum age, see LORCA NAVARRETE, supra note 12, at 34-37. The
author himself defends proposals to raise the minimum age to thirty years old, as in a previous Spanish
Jury Law promulgated by Minister of Justice Alonso Martinez on April 20, 1988, known as the "Pache-
co Law." For another proposal to fix this minimum age at twenty-four years old, see Manuel Miranda
Estrampes, El jurado, REVISTA DEL PODER JUDICIAL 419, 426 (2006).
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(2) Incompatibilities: Listed in Article 10, these causes refer to people
unable to perform jury service because of their public position,19 such as
the King, the Royal Family and other family members, 20 national and re-
gional Prime Ministers, Members of Parliament, Senators,21 magistrates of
the Constitutional Court,22 the ombudsman, judges, prosecutors, 23 Civil
servants working in the justice administration, penitentiary institutions,
delegates of the Governor's office, lawyers in general, lecturers at law
schools, 24 members of the armed forces and the security services, and dip-
lomats in general.
(3) Prohibitions: Listed under Article 11 and common to all judicial
proceedings, these prohibitions bar the participation of certain people be-
cause of their positions in the process. 25 Pertinent positions in this case
include being a party to the same criminal proceeding, participating in the
same criminal proceeding as a witness or expert, having a relationship with
any of the parties in the proceedings, and having a direct or indirect interest
in the same criminal cause.
(4) Excuses: Contemplated in Article 12, these causes concern people
who are over sixty-five years of age, have acted as jurors in the past four
years or are experiencing serious family-related problems, perform work of
relevant public interest, are resident in a foreign country, serve in the armed
forces, or affirm and justify any other causes that would be a serious hin-
drance to their role as jurors.
Concerning the jury selection process itself, the preparation of jury
lists is regulated in the L.O.T.J. under the heading "Designation of the ju-
rors," although other terms are used,26 including the "organization of the
19. See Consuelo Rios Molina, LAS INCOMPATIBILIDADES DEL ARTICULO 10 DE LA LEY
DEL JURADO, 3 LA LEY 1566 (1998).
20. As well as their spouses. B.O.E. 1981, 297.
21. In central, regional, and local Assemblies, as well as in the European Parliament. This applies
to the entire executive and legislative groups at all administrative levels (i.e., mayors).
22. Or individuals linked to them, as well as members of General Council of Judiciary Branch
(Consejo General del Poder Judicial or CGPJ) and the Office of the Attorney General. Members of the
Court of Auditors (Tribunal de Cuentas) are also excluded, as are members of the Council of State
(Consejo de Estado).
23. Those belonging to martial courts are also included, as Spain has a separate jurisdiction for
military forces regulated by Organic Law 4/1987 (July 15th). B.O.E. 1987, 171.
24. With the inclusion of procurators as a legal profession that is separated from the provision of
legal counsel under Spanish procedural rules. Lecturers in Legal Medicine at medical schools are also
included in this category.
25. General reasons in this sense for judges and magistrates are provided in LEY ORGANICA DEL
PODER JUDICIAL [L.O.P.J.] [Law on the Judiciary] art. 219 (Spain).
26. L.O.T.J. § 3, arts. 13-23. See in this context Antonio Gisbert Gisbert, Designacidn de candi-
datos a jurados para cada causa (Algunas reflexiones sabre los articulos 18 a 23 de la Ley Orgdnica
del Tribunal del Jurado), 621 REVISTA GENERAL DEL DERECHO 6571 (1996). See the use of the term
"selection" in D. Jos6 Martin Ostos, LA SELECC1ON DEL JURADO, 2 JUSTICIA 405 (1997), and
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Jury Office" which is employed by some authors. 27 Jury selection proce-
dures are extremely complicated and critics have proposed their simplifica-
tion,28 though to no effect for the moment. Starting with these selection
procedures, the Provincial Electoral Offices make an initial random selec-
tion of jurors from the local electoral census,29 which is publicly available
at every town hall and appears in the official Journal of each Province. 30
This availability allows prospective jurors to request disqualification if they
consider themselves unsuitable according to any of the causes outlined in
Articles 9-12 discussed above. Such claims must be presented in printed
form with copies of any necessary supporting documentation and should be
addressed to the senior judge of the judicial circumscription, who will ei-
ther uphold or reject them.31 Once the senior judge has dealt with these
claims, the definitive list will be published in every province in November
and sent to the provincial court. The prospective jurors on that list may be
summoned to the Jury Court at any time over the two-year period starting
on January 1st of the following year.32
The jury selection process takes place when a criminal cause for
judgment under the rules of the L.O.T.J. is referred to the Provincial Court
from the Office of the Investigative Judge.33 At that point, the selection of
the panel for a particular case takes place, during which the clerk of court
Jos6 Luis Vdzquez Sotelo, LA SELECCION DE LOS JURADOS, 3 JUSTICIA 813 (1997). P. Casano-
vas Romeu uses both terms, Intervencion de las partes en el proceso de seleccidn de los Jurados;
atencidn al criterio de decisidn de los candidatos, estrategias de comunicacidn, in ESTUDIOS
JURIDICOS. CUERPO DE SECRETARIOS JUDICIALES V-1999 383 (1999).
27. See, e.g., Carmen Galipienso Calatayud, La organizacidn de la Oficina del Jurado. Proceso de
conformacidn del jurado. Sorteo y seleccidn del Tribunal del Jurado, 16 LA LEY PENAL 5 (2005).
28. See, e.g., Francisco Javier A. de Frutos Virseda, HACIA UN NUEVO PROCESO DE
SELECCION DE LOS JURADOS, 4 LA LEY 1632 (2001).
29. See criticism on this point by Vicente Gimeno Sendra, La segunda reforma urgente de la Ley
del Jurado, 39 PODER JUDICIAL 419, 421 (1995) (making the argument to attribute these competences
to the municipalities as that is where the public may consult the lists of prospective jurors).
30. There is a special rule on the selection process of prospective jurors in Royal Decree
1398/1995 (August 4th). B.O.E. 1995, 186.
31. L.O.T.J. arts. 14-15. According to Articles 14 and 15, any citizen may present a motion to
dismiss a prospective juror grounded in any of the legal causes for disqualification. This sort of motion
differs from those that the public may present within seven days after the initial selection process,
which may be challenged by any citizen in the Provincial Courts according to Article 13(3) of the
L.O.T.J. Also, Article 13 contains a formula for the calculation of the number of prospective jurors to
be selected from the electoral census in each Spanish province, based on the number of jury trials held
in the preceding year and those estimated for the following year.
32. L.O.T.J. art. 16(2). For this reason they are attached to the Provincial Court and it is their
obligation to communicate any changes of address or circumstances that might affect their status as
jurors.
33. Article 87(1)(a) of the LEY ORGANICA DEL PODER JUDICIAL [L.O.P.J.] [Law on the Judiciary]
(Spain) invests the Investigative Judges with competence to conduct the preliminary criminal proceed-
ing or investigative phase. The same provisions are also included in Articles 24-28 of the L.O.T.J.
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plays an essential role. 34 A new random selection process using a computer
program chooses the thirty-six prospective jurors from the definitive list for
every criminal cause. Once selected, the clerk gives a questionnaire along
with a jury-handbook 35 to the thirty-six prospective jurors36 in order to
ensure that they are fully informed. They therefore have a second opportu-
nity to allege reasons against their inclusion in the panel as prospective
jurors, in accordance with the causes for qualification and disqualification.
Each juror has to complete the questionnaire, which will contain responses
that relate to the lawful grounds for disqualification, 37 and return it to the
Provincial Court, providing supporting documentation if necessary.
Article 21 states that copies of the questionnaires completed by the
prospective jurors will be delivered to the parties in the jury trial, including
the prosecutor, parties to the prosecution, private prosecution where appli-
cable,38 and defense counsel. The parties in the jury trial then present any
allegations and challenges, which are decided by the magistrate-president
of the Provincial Court39 by judicial order after a preliminary hearing be-
34. See Raiil Cdsar Cancio Fernindez, La intervencidn del Secretario Judicial en el Tribunal del
Jurado, 1890 BOLETiN DE INFORMAC16N DEL MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA 1117 (2001).
35. This handbook contains useful information on the institution of the jury and the role of the
juror written in easily understandable, non-juridical language. MANUAL DEL JURADO [JURY MANUAL],
B.O.E. 1996.
36. L.O.T.J. art. 19. In fact, the envelopes addressed to the prospective jurors are identified by a
number. Every envelope includes a list of instructions in order to fill in the questionnaire and some
legal provisions concerning causes for disqualification determined by the L.O.T.J. and others (e.g.,
those related to family or to other kinds of relationships), as well as the above-mentioned jury handbook
and a self-addressed stamped envelope to return the completed questionnaire to the Provincial Court.
37. L.O.T.J. art. 20. In particular, the questionnaire contains aspects related to the requirements to
act as a juror as well as the causes for disqualification drawn up in separate paragraphs, following the
same order as in the legal rules (incapacities, incompatibilities, prohibitions, and excuses), with spaces
in which to put the answers. It also includes questions on distances to travel to the court and the candi-
date's personal data. This personal data refers to the candidate's name, identity card number, date of
birth, sex, address, telephone number, professional degree, civil status, occupation, educational level,
and secondary address or telephone numbers, and includes a space in which to list any attachments or
copies of any documents.
38. Note that Article 125 of the Spanish Constitution allows private individuals "to initiate the
prosecution of an offense whether or not they are the victims of an offence." For an extensive discus-
sion on this issue in the English language, see Julio P6rez Gil, Private Interests Seeking Punishment:
Prosecution Brought by Private Individuals and Groups in Spain, 25 LAW & POL'Y 151, 155 (2003).
Pdrez Gil defines this popular accusation in Spain as "an accusation exercised by a person who does not
have a direct relation to the legal goods that are endangered or damaged." Id However, Spanish law
imposes strict requirements on those wishing to exercise this right, which is reserved for Spanish citi-
zens acting in a private capacity; foreigners are not granted this right. See LEY DE ENJUICIAMIENTO
CRIMINAL [L.E. CRIM.] [Code of Criminal Procedure] arts. 101, 270 (Spain). Contrary opinions are
expressed on the rights of European citizens in this respect by Vicente Gimeno Sendra, La acusacion
popular, 31 PODER JUDICIAL 87, 90 (1993), translated in 4 REVUE DE SCIENCE CRIMINELLE ET DE DROIT
PENAL COMPARE 739 (1994) (Fr.).
39. Ana Maria Rios Cabrera, LA RECUSACI6NDEL PERSONAL JURISDICCIONAL POPULAR
CONFORME A LA LEY ORGANICA 5/1995, DEL TRIBUNAL DEL JURADO, 1-2 JUSTICIA 139
(1998).
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hind closed doors in the presence of the parties, the clerk of the court, and
the magistrate-president. 40 In theory and textually, legal rules provide that
challenges may only refer to the absence of qualification or the existence of
any cause of incapacity, incompatibility, or prohibition, and none of the
excuses are foreseen as grounds of challenge. 4 1 It should be noted that, at
present, for the selection of jurors, Spanish legislation only provides chal-
lenges for cause and never for peremptory challenges. In contrast, legal
provisions for such challenges are possible once the nine jurors that will
form the jury and the two substitutes have been selected.42
The jury selection process ends with a list of twenty prospective jurors
constituting the panel. If less than twenty remain, a new random selection
is carried out according to the instructions in Article 23. The organic regu-
lation of the jury ends at this point, and the trial by jury procedure begins.
Prior to discussing this phase, some references to current judicial practice
on this topic are necessary.
B. Judicial Practice: Allegations and Excuses by Prospective Jurors. The
"Hidden" Conscientious Objection Clause
We turn to the aforementioned allegations and excuses that take place
in judicial practice by examining some examples taken from the Provincial
Court of Burgos. In this context, most but not all of the causes that prospec-
tive jurors enter in the questionnaires sent by the clerk of the Provincial
Court relate to the list of excuses under Article 12. Sometimes, incompati-
bilities or even causes for prohibition are also cited, and, not uncommonly,
incompliance with the conditions for qualification. Nevertheless, one-third
of all prospective jurors generally present excuses, bearing in mind that the
questionnaires are sent to a total of thirty-six prospective jurors.43
40. On some occasions, this hearing does not always take place and is substituted by a written
procedure, the information on which is shared with the parties. This possibility, although recognized as
irregular, has been guaranteed by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., S.T.S., July 22, 2009 (R.G.D., No.
4911).
41. See L.O.T.J. arts. 8-11. In practice, most of the reasons given by prospective jurors are in the
specific list of excuses in Article 12, as will be set out. Other arguments fall under Article 22's title
"resolution of excuses," a hearing that is usually known as "vista de excusas" or "excuses hearing."
42. Article 40 of the L.O.T.J. allows peremptory rejection of four jury members by the defense
and a further four by the prosecution, bearing in mind that the prosecution may be jointly composed of
public, private, and popular accusations and various legal representatives may constitute the defense.
43. As an example, eight prospective jurors at the Provincial Court of Burgos presented allega-
tions and excuses in Jury Proceeding n.2/2000, Jury Selection File n.304/2006. Documentation on each
jury selection process is held on a separate file. Thirteen prospective jurors presented reasons and
excuses in Jury Proceeding n. 2/2009, Jury Selection File n. 303/2010.
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An examination of the judicial files reveals that some of the causes put
forward are not exactly excuses but are causes for disqualification, such as
disability or incompatibility. For instance, a prospective juror charged with
mistreatment and abuse in a family context was, as contemplated in Article
9(2), "subject to indictment" and as such was unable to become a juror.44
Because he presented a copy of the respective judgment, the cause was
approved ex officio without any need for further discussion at the "excuses
hearing." Another commonly alleged incompatibility is the status of mayor
or town councilor under Article 10(4), which, when justified by supporting
documentation, is automatically approved without further consideration by
the parties or the magistrate-president.
More surprising still is incompliance with the conditions for qualifica-
tion required by Article 8. This might suggest that the electoral census is
erroneous to some extent in Spain, especially the data on residence, age,45
educational level, and even the death register. Speculation of this nature is
prompted by the number of statements made by prospective jurors to the
effect that they live in a different province supported by proof of residency
from a town council, 46 that they are illiterate, 47 or even that the person
summoned to do jury service is dead, supported by a death certificate pre-
sented by a relative. All these and similar cases are upheld by the magi-
strate-president in a judicial order whenever the documentary evidence is
sufficient. 48 Further difficulties and a reluctance to do jury service are be-
hind statements that affirm physical and/or mental disabilities that would
prevent a person from doing jury service in accordance with Article 8(5).
44. See C6DIGO PENAL [C.P.] [Criminal Code] arts. 153, 172 (Spain), which was enacted by
Organic Law 10/1995 (November 23rd), B.O.E. 1995, 281, and amended by Organic Law 1/2004
(December 28th), B.O.E. 2004, 313. This topic has acquired enormous importance in Spain, and legisla-
tion has established special courts in order to deal with these kinds of gender-related offenses against
women in or following a sentimental relationship; i.e., Judges of Violence against the Women-a sort
of Investigative Judge with competence for certain civil matters related to civil status. For more details,
see Mar Jimeno Bulnes, JURISDICCION Y COMPETENCIA EN MATERIA DE VIOLENCIA DE
GENERO: LOS JUZGADOS DE VIOLENCIA SOBRE LA MUJER. PROBLEMATICA A LA LUZ DE
SU EXPERIENCIA, 1-2 JUSTICIA 157 (2009), as well as Mar Jimeno Bulnes, VIOLENCIA DE
GENERO: ASPECTOS ORGANICOS Y COMPETENCIALES, in TUTELA JURISDICCIONAL
FRENTE A LA VIOLENCIA DE GENERO: ASPECTOS PROCESALES, CIVILES, PENALES Y
LABORALES 299 (Montserrat de Hoyos Sancho ed., 2009).
45. The most frequent age-related reason of being over sixty-five years old is presented as an
excuse, as described in Article 12(l) of the L.O.T.J., and is not a qualification condition.
46. L.O.T.J. art. 8(4).
47. L.O.T.J. art. 8(3).
48. Thus, illiteracy was not upheld as a reason to disqualify the prospective juror who was unable
to present any justification. This could be described as a case of "diabolica probation."
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Medical certificates are not always accepted by the different parties and the
judge, on whose discretionary criteria a great deal depends. 49
In any event, the high number of statements to support disqualification
relates to the number of excuses provided under Article 12, especially those
involving people over the age of sixty-five, the performance of family
tasks, work of general interest, or work that may not be delegated. The first
reason, being over the age of sixty-five, causes few problems as it will
obviously be upheld when accompanied by supporting documentation tak-
en, for example, from the civil registry or even the national identity card
held by all Spanish citizens. The performance of family chores is still al-
leged in Spain as an excuse-mostly in cases of prospective female jurors
who wish to refuse jury service on the grounds that they need to care for
elder relatives or young children 50-which usually involves the presenta-
tion of the Libro de Familia (Family Book). However, these kinds of
excuses are generally neither upheld by the parties nor, in the end, by the
magistrate-president. The same judicial criteria are usually applied to the
excuses that stress the importance or public interest associated with the
prospective juror's employment. Different kinds of jobs are put forward,
such as self-employed truck drivers who own their own vehicle, lecturers
and teachers, or even, in some cases, farmers claiming that their livestock
will go unfed, supported by proof of farming activity. All these excuses are
rejected by the parties as well as by magistrates, as those jobs or activities
are not expressly excluded in the L.O.T.J. as reasons for avoiding jury ser-
vice.
Finally, a last-ditch excuse is used in most of the applications that al-
lege causes other than those specifically listed. Some are based on Article
12(7),51 but this provision, as already mentioned, is commonly used in
practice as a conscientious objection "escape" clause. 52 Specifically, the
sentences "I do not feel capable of acting as a juror" and "I am not a suita-
ble person" are very often given as reasons by prospective jurors to avoid
49. For example, medical reports have been accepted that referred to anxiety and depression,
which were the cause of a potential juror's loss of employment. Certification has also been presented on
physical disability due to diabetes and indispensable medical treatment. In another case, physical disa-
bility due to a heart operation and subsequent disability certified in a medical report were upheld. On
the contrary, the sequels to a kidney transplant were turned down as a reason.
50. Information held on file refers to home care for a ninety-six year-old relative, babies, and
children of six and eight years old.
51. One example was an excuse used by the wife of a penitentiary director where the accused was
held in custody; an excuse that was rejected by the parties and the magistrate-president on the basis that
she would not enter into contact with the prisoner held in preventive custody. In another example, a
potential juror attached a copy of a public transport timetable to the excuse to demonstrate the impossi-
bility of attending court for geographical reasons, which was also dismissed by the magistrate-president.
52. In defense of "hidden" conscientious objections, see LORCA NAVARRETE, supra note 12, at 73.
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jury service.53 In practice, the criterion applied by the Provincial Court of
Burgos rejects this reason, as there is no evidence of any impediment that
might prevent or hamper the fulfillment of jury service from a literal read-
ing of Article 12(7). However, the same cause put forward by a prospective
juror sometimes prompts a peremptory challenge under Article 40,54 when
selecting the jury before the trial starts from the twenty prospective jurors
(which is the minimum required under Article 23). Both the parties and the
magistrate-president wish to avoid reluctant jurors whose presence on the
jury is considered by experience to be "disturbing."55
II. JURY TRIAL: GENERAL REMARKS ON THEORY AND PRACTICE
Let us now turn to the development of the jury proceedings. A sum-
mary description of the jury trial rules in the L.O.T.J. will help us under-
stand the theoretical development of jury trials in Spain. Even though not
all judicial practitioners fully adhere to these legal rules-practices de-
scribed by the General Council of the Judiciary Branch as the "avoidance
of jury trial" 56-they are operative in most Spanish Provincial Courts,
helped by particular jurisprudence from the Supreme Court. This aspect
will be examined through the prism of two important issues: (1) the restric-
tion of the competence of jury courts, and (2) the settlement of particular
agreements between the accused and prosecution in the form of "plea bar-
gaining," when fundamental aspects of the case are cut and dry, although
this particular approach is not expressly contemplated in the L.O.T.J.
A. Jury Trial Rules
The first point relates to the kind of proceedings envisaged in the
L.O.T.J., which considers jury proceedings as "special proceedings" de-
53. This excuse is used at least once or twice in every case reported and sometimes even more.
54. Both the defense and the prosecution can challenge a maximum of four jurors without cause,
although it may be recalled that several parties can join the prosecution (public prosecutor, private
prosecutor, and even popular prosecutor) in Spain. For this reason, if several prosecutors or the accused
participate, they should firmly agree on the four jurors to be challenged. Otherwise, the magistrate-
president will raffle the order in which the different defense and prosecution teams may present their
challenges, until the quota of four is reached, as detailed in Article 40(3) of the L.O.T.J.
55. Manuel Miranda Estrampes expresses the same opinion. See Estrampes, supra note 18, at 428.
56. CONSEJo GENERAL DEL PODER JUDICIAL [C.G.P.D.] [GENERAL COUNCIL OF THE JUDICIARY
BRANCH], MAY 5 REPORT ON LEY ORGANICA DEL TRIBUNAL DEL JURADO 5/1995 (1999) [hereinafter
C.G.P.D. 1999 REPORT]; C.G.P.D., JANUARY 14 REPORT ON LEY ORGANICA DEL TRIBUNAL DEL
JURADO 5/1995 (1998) [hereinafter C.G.P.D. 1998 REPORT]. These reports were approved in the ple-
nary sessions of January 14, 1998, and May 5, 1999, on the practical application of the L.O.T.J. in
Spain.
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spite authoritative opinions to the contrary that defend its ordinary nature. 57
The jury proceeding's special nature can be seen in its exclusive compe-
tence to pass judgment on criminal matters, specific offenses, and crimes
according to the rules described in Article 1(2): cases of murder and homi-
cide, threats with menaces, failure to render aid, trespass in a dwelling,
arson in forestland, and several kinds of crimes against the Public Adminis-
tration, such as mishandling official documents, bribery, influence ped-
dling, embezzlement of public funds, fraud and illegal levies demanded by
public officials, prohibited negotiations by public officials, and mistreat-
ment of prisoners.58
The general characteristics of the Spanish jury trial are those common
to all of the criminal procedures in this country. Perhaps the most expres-
sive feature is the enforcement of the adversarial system59 because every
piece of evidence must be presented at the oral hearing (juicio oral). The
Preliminary Recitals of the L.O.T.J. are careful to point out that the adver-
sary principle is envisaged throughout the jury court proceedings: "The
current Law intends that trial by jury should result in the complete eradica-
tion of this procedural deformity through the presentation of the entirety of
the evidence before the jury."60 This is certainly not new for trial procedure
but it is for the preliminary investigation.6' For this reason, it has been
argued that procedural safeguards throughout this investigative phase are
much more strictly observed in jury proceedings than in any other criminal
proceedings. 62
Likewise, instead of regulating only the trial procedure-usually
called "plenary" or "oral trial"-before the Jury Court, the L.O.T.J. con-
templates the development of pretrial procedures before the Investigative
57. Among the selected handbooks on Criminal Procedural Law, see VICENTE GIMENO SENDRA,
MANUAL DE DERECHO PROCESAL PENAL 460 (2d ed. 2010). Alternatively, as previously men-
tioned, G6MEZ COLOMER, EL PROCESO PENAL ESPECIAL, supra note 11.
58. See comments by Agustin-Jestis Prez-Cruz Martin, La competencia del Tribunal del Jurado,
49 REVISTA DEL PODER JUDICIAL 543 (1998).
59. For a presentation on the issue as it relates to Spain, see TERESA ARMENTA DEU, PRINCIPIO
ACUSATORIO Y DERECHO PENAL (Jos6 M. Bosch ed., 1995). In relation to the jury proceeding,
see Jaime Suau Morey, LA LEY DEL JURADO Y EL MODELO ACUSATORIO, 2 JUSTICIA 251
(1999).
60. L.O.T.J. pmbl. 111(1), para. 5, translated in Thaman, supra note 2, at 272.
61. With regard to this pretrial procedure, as in most continental European criminal legal orders,
the general system is the inquisitorial system, which is followed by the 1882 Spanish Criminal Proce-
dural Law. As is well-known, the mixture of both systems produces the formal or mixed accusatory
model in continental European countries. In this general context, see EUROPEAN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURES (Mireille Delmas-Marty & J. R. Spencer eds., J. R. Spencer et al. trans., 2002), as well as
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN EUROPE (Richard Vogler & Barbara Huber eds., 2008).
62. This opinion is supported by Antonio Maria Lorca Navarrete, La garantia de la instruccian
sumarial en elproceso penal con jurado, 22 REVISTA DE DERECHO Y PROCESO PENAL 13 (2009).
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Judge (Juez de Instrucci6n)63 as well as the so-called "intermediate phase."
The intermediate phase has become an essential step in the Spanish crimi-
nal process and entails a discussion prior to the opening of the "oral phase
of the trial" or the dismissal of the case before the trial, once the criminal
investigation has been evaluated. In the L.O.T.J., this phase is called the
preliminary hearing because it is developed orally in a session with the
parties to the case. 64
In this brief analysis of the L.O.T.J., this Article will focus on the trial
procedure side-stepping the pretrial procedure.65 It is beyond the scope of
this Article to comment on the whole trial by jury; rather, this Article will
focus only on some of the Spanish jury trial's peculiarities. In this regard,
respectful of the procedural guarantees of orality and publicity generally
provided for in the "oral phase of the trial," as opposed to during the inves-
tigative phase, with the aforementioned exceptions in the L.O.T.J., the jury
trial also takes place in a public session, the date for which is fixed in the
"writ on justiciable facts" (auto de hechos justiciables).66 This writ is deli-
vered by the magistrate-president of the jury court and contains the basic
facts to be judged as well as their legal descriptions together with a deci-
sion on the evidence proposed by the parties. 67
Of course, the trial itself must begin with the constitution of the jury
panel, which occurs after the jury selection has taken place, as noted above.
This is logically the most representative part of the proceedings since regu-
lation of the development of the trial defers to ordinary procedural rules,
which operate as subsidiary laws,68 except for some evidential peculiarities,
63. See Jaime Vegas Torres, Las actuaciones ante el juzgado de instruccidn en el procedimiento
-para el juicio con jurado, in LA LEY DEL JURADO: PROBLEMAS DE APLICACI6N PRACTICA 59 (Luis
Aguiar de Luque & Luciano Varela Castro eds., 2004).
64. L.O.T.J. arts. 30-35. See also Antonio del Moral Garcia, Lafase intermedia en elproceso ante
el Tribunal del Jurado, I ACTUALIDAD PENAL 99 (1996).
65. For a complete treatment of pretrial procedure, see, e.g., Manuel Pascual Ortells Ramos, Sobre
la instruccidn previa en el procedimiento ante el Jurado, 2 TRIBUNALES DE JUSTICIA 165 (1998); Jos6
Antonio Diaz Cabiale, Lafase preliminar en el procedimiento ante el Tribunal del Jurado, 2 REVISTA
VASCA DE DERECHO PROCESAL Y ARBITRAJE 149 (1996); J.A. Martin y Martin, Consideraciones sobre
la instrucci6n en el procedimiento regulado en la nueva ley del Tribunal del Jurado, I ACTUALIDAD
PENAL 231 (1996); Agustin-Jesfis Prez-Cruz Martin, Reflexiones sobre la instruccidn en el nuevo
proceso penal ante el Tribunal del Jurado. Especial consideracidn de los arts. 24 a 35 de la L. 0.
5/1995, del Tribunal del Jurado, 610-11 REVISTA GENERAL DEL DERECHO 8085 (1995). See also
ESTHER GONZALEZ PILLADO, INSTRUCCION Y PREPARACION DEL JUICIO ORAL EN EL
PROCEDIMIENTO ANTE EL TRIBUNAL DEL JURADO (2000); Luciano Varela Castro, LA
DVSTRUCCIN DE LOS PROCESOS ANTE EL TRIBUNAL DEL JURADO Y EL JUICIO DE
ACUSACION, in JUICIO POR JURADO: EXPERIENCIA Y REVISI6N, supra note 8, at 71.
66. L.O.T.J. art. 37(e).
67. A full description of its content is provided in Article 37 of the L.O.T.J.
68. L.O.T.J. art. 42(1). Also, Article 24(2) makes general reference to the rules of Criminal Proce-
dural Law without specifying which kind of procedure, ordinary or fast-track, but the clear mention of
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all of which are prescribed in Article 46. Essentially, this precept contem-
plates the right of the jurors to evaluate the evidence by themselves and, for
instance, to pose direct questions to witnesses, experts, and the accused and
to examine documents and papers.69
The appointment of the jury panel for the trial usually takes place in
the presence of the parties to the trial and the clerk of the court, according
to the procedures contained in Article 38.70 The law requires that there be
twenty prospective jurors to constitute the panel from which the trial jury is
composed.7' The magistrate-president will submit the twenty jurors to a
new round of oral questioning that relates to the previously examined caus-
es for qualification and disqualification. 72 Once the nine trial jurors who
will form the jury and the two substitutes have been balloted according to
Article 40(3), the parties will once again have the opportunity to challenge
the jurors; first with cause and then in a peremptory challenge without
cause. Every party can challenge a maximum of four jurors without cause;
however, if several prosecutors or accused participate, they should agree on
the four jurors to be challenged, otherwise the magistrate-president will
conduct a raffle to decide the order of the challenges. 73 Finally, once the
jury has been selected, all the jurors must take the oath or promise 74; oth-
erwise, they face a 6300 fine that is imposed by the magistrate-president. 75
A jury court may be dismissed in advance, if either the counsel or the
magistrate-president considers there to be insufficient evidence 76 following
some prescriptions regulating the ordinary procedure, such as Articles 25(2) and 26, and the general
character of the former justifies the application of its regulations as a subsidiary regulation.
69. See Jos6 Maria Planchat Teruel, El juicio oral ante el Tribunal del Jurado, I ACTUALIDAD
PENAL 371 (1996). For more recent articles, see Alberto Jorge Barreiro, CUESTIONES PROBA TORLAS
EN LOS JUICIOS ANTE EL TRIBUNAL DEL JURADO, in ALBERTO JORGE BARREIRO ET AL., supra
note 6, at 19, 19-85, as well as Raquel L6pez Jiminez, LA PRUEBA YEL JUICIO ORAL ENLA LEY
DEL JURADO, in JUICIO POR JURADO: EXPERIENCIA Y REVISION, supra note 8, at 149-96.
See also RAQUEL L6PEZ JIMtNEZ, LA PRUEBA EN EL JUICIO POR JURADOS (2002).
70. For more on this topic, see Miguel Gutirrez Carboiell, Sinopsis de la constitucidn del tribu-
nal del jurado y del juicio oral: arts. 38 a 51, excluido el art. 46, in JUICIO POR JURADO:
EXPERIENCIA Y REVISI6N, supra note 8, at 202.
71. L.O.T.J. art. 38(1).
72. L.O.T.J. art. 38(2).
73. L.O.T.J. art. 40(3).
74. The legal prescription reproduced in Article 41(1) of the L.O.T.J. is as follows: "Do you swear
or promise to perform well and faithfully the function of juror, with impartiality, without dislike or
affection, examining the accusation, considering the evidence and deciding whether the accused is
guilty or not guilty of the offenses that are the object of the proceeding . . . , as well as to keep the
deliberations secret?" See Juan Luis Moreno Retamino, EL JURAMENTO 0 PROMESA DE LOS
JURADOSENESPARA, 5 LA LEY 2015 (2000).
75. L.O.T.J. art. 41(4).
76. For example, this was the case of judgment number 227937 in the Provincial Court at Burgos
pronounced on June 8, 2001. S.A.P., June 8, 2001, (J.T.S., No. 227937). Of course, Article 65 of the
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a motion from the defense counsel, as provided for in Article 49. Alterna-
tively, a jury court may be dismissed when a consensus with the defense is
reached on the charges to which the accused will plead guilty (conformi-
dad, similar to plea bargaining in the United States)77 and the penalty does
not exceed six years imprisonment, as described in Article 50. Unless these
circumstances arise, a jury trial will end with the description of the "verdict
subject matter." The verdict subject matter's form is determined by law78
and it will be given to the jurors with the usual "instructions" or summing
up,79 bringing the jury trial to an end and starting the deliberation proce-
dure to pronounce the verdict. In this respect, the L.O.T.J. is peculiar in that
it contemplates a verdict of a special kind or sui generis, far removed from
common law procedures.
In short, Article 59(1) specifies the legal requirement of five votes to
prove a fact that is in the accused's favor, but seven votes if it is not favor-
able to the accused, which reflects a logical consideration that the latter is
of greater seriousness. 80 But, certainly, the most astonishing rule for those
familiar with a conventional jury system is the need for the verdict to be
reasoned. Article 61(1 )(d) sets out the requirement that "a brief explanation
of the reasons which justify the declaration of certain facts as proven or
L.O.T.J. also contemplates subsequent dismissal of the jury when the verdict does not reach the legally
required number of votes, in which case a new trial with another jury will be held.
77. See, in Spain, NICOLAS CABEZUDO RODRIGUEZ, EL MINISTERIO PJBLICO Y LA
JUSTICIA NEGOCIADA EN LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS DE NORTEAMERICA (1996). See also
SANJURJO REBOLLO, supra note 10, at 213-59; NICOLAS RODRIGUEZ GARCIA, LA JUSTICIA PENAL
NEGOCIADA. EXPERIENCIAS DE DERECHO COMPARADO (1997). On jury proceedings, see
Luis-Alfredo de Diego Diez, LA CONFORMIDAD EN LA LEY DEL TRIBUNAL DEL JURADO, 2 LA
LEY 1304 (1996).
78. See L.O.T.J. art. 52. See also comments by Jos6 Garberi Llobregat, FORMACI5N Y
CONTENIDOS DEL <OBJETO DE VEREDICTO) EN LA NUEVA DE LA LEY ORGANICA DEL
TRIBUNAL DEL JURADO, 3 LA LEY 1431 (1996); Daniel de Alfonso Laso, La determinacidn del
objeto del veredicto: problemas pricticos y reales que se pueden liegar a plantear, 16 LA LEY PENAL
27 (2005); and more extensively, JUAN MANUEL BERMUDEZ REQUENA, EL OBJETO DEL
VEREDICTO EN LA L.O. 5/1995, DE 22 DE MAYO, DEL TRIBUNAL DEL JURADO (2004). For
more recent articles, see Angel Luis Hurtado Adridn, OBJETO DEL VEREDICTO E
INSTRUCCIONES, in ALBERTO JORGE BARREIRO ET AL., supra note 6, at 87, 87-162, as well as Lo-
renzo del Rio Femndez, EL VEREDICTO Y LA SENTENCIA. FORMULA CI6N DEL OBJETO DEL
VEREDICTO. MOTIVA CIN Y CONTROL JUDICIAL, in JUICIO POR JURADO: EXPERIENCIA Y
REVISION, supra note 8, at 297.
79. See L.O.T.J. art. 54. On this issue, Jos6 Manuel de Paul Velasco, Instrucciones al Jurado.
Observaciones prdcticas con alguna incursidn tedrica, in PROBLEMAS DEL JUICIO ORAL CON JURADO
203 (1999), with some suggestions and examples in this respect. A particular reference to summing up
in common law is included in Mar Jimeno Bulnes, La institucidn del jurado en el Reino Unido y el
rigimen especial de Irlanda del Norte, 1-3 REVISTA DE DERECHO PROCESAL 343, 373-404 (2001), and
MARIA-ANGELES PtREZ CEBADERA, LAS INSTRUCCIONES AL JURADO (2003). For a more recent
and general view on recent proposals see Nancy S. Marder, Bringing Jury Instructions into the Twenty-
First Century, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 449 (2006).
80. See Javier L6pez Sanchez, El veredicto de culpabilidad del Jurado, 12 TRIBUNALES DE
JUSTICIA 1159 (1999).
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unproven" appear in the draft verdict. Problems arise because of the need to
determine whether the verdict forms fulfill this requirement and how the
expression "brief explanation of the reasons" can be interpreted.8' There
are arguments for 82 and against 83 this provision and it is one of the most
debated points of the L.O.T.J. among Spanish scholars. The jurisprudence
delivered by the Supreme Court has enounced three alternative theses by
which the suitability of the reasoning in jury verdicts may be assessed.84
Moreover, this issue also has important and practical consequences.
An unreasoned or poorly reasoned verdict may be legally submitted for
judicial review in two ways: either to the jury college by the magistrate-
president according to Article 63(l)(e), or to the Regional Supreme Court
for appeal,85 which will proceed to nullify the whole sentence as a real
cassation. 86 After an appellate judgment from the Regional Supreme Court,
only an ordinary cassation before the Supreme Court in Madrid is possible,
81. See Yolanda Doig Diaz, Sobre la motivaci6n del veredicto del Tribunal del Jurado: jurispru-
dencia aplicada a la prtictica, 16 LA LEY PENAL 88 (2005); Antonio Maria Lorca Navarrete, LA
MOTIVACIN DEL VEREDICTO EN LA DOCTRINA Y EN LA RECIENTE JURISPRUDENCIA: EN
CONCRETO LA DENOMINADA "DUDA RAZONABLE," I LA LEY 1540 (2003). See also criticism
by lItaki Esparza Leibar, Algunas cuestiones sobre el veredicto en la Ley del Jurado, 4 TRIBUNALES DE
JUSTICIA 451 (2000).
82. See, e.g., Antonio Maria Lorca Navarrete, LA DELIBERACION DEL JURADO EN LA
DECLARACION DEL HECHO PROBADO Y PROCLAMACION DE LA CULPABILIDAD 0
INCULPABILIDAD DEL ACUSADO EN LA DOCTRINA Y EN LA RECIENTE JURISPRUDENCIA, 2
LA LEY 1413 (2003).
83. In particular, Esparza Leibar, supra note 81, at 457.
84. These positions vary from the strictest interpretation (the "maximalist thesis"), which requires
a thorough description of the whole deliberation process and that concludes with a declaration that
certain facts have or have not been proven, to the most flexible interpretation (the "minimalist thesis"),
which permits general references to the evidence with less detail. Nevertheless, the intermediate posi-
tion is preferred by the Supreme Court, which supports an itemized specification of all points relevant
to the evidence without requiring the accuracy of judicial reasoning (which in any case is provided
afterwards by the magistrate-president when pronouncing the sentence). See more extensively, with
references to jurisprudence by the Supreme Court, Jimeno-Bulnes, supra note 4, at 769-73, see also, for
Spain, Jaime Vegas Torres, LA MOTIVACION DEL VEREDICTO EN LA JURISPRUDENCIA DEL
TRIBUNAL SUPREMO, in JOSE ANTONIO MARTIN PALLIN ET AL., LA LEY DEL JURADO EN SU X
ANIVERSARIO 85 (2006).
85. Provisions for this are contained in ordinary procedural rules, such as Article 846(a) of the
L.E. CRIM. For more on the topic, see Coral Arangiena Fanego, El recurso de apelacidn contra senten-
cias en los procesos ante el Tribunal del Jurado, 47 PODER JUDICIAL 207 (1997), and MARCO
VILLAG6MEZ CEBRIAN, LA "APELACION" DE LA SENTENCIA EN EL JUICIO CON JURADO
(1998).
86. See Maria Luisa Garcia Torres, El control judicial de los defectos del veredicto, 3
TRIBUNALES DE JUSTICIA 65 (2003). For more on judicial review, see Jos6 Manuel Maza Martin, LOS
RECURSOS EN EL PROCESO ANTE EL TRIBUNAL DEL JURADO, in ALBERTO JORGE BARREIRO ET
AL., supra note 6, at 207, 207-85, and JUAN MONTERO AROCA, LOS RECURSOS EN EL PROCESO ANTE EL
TRIBUNAL DEL JURADO (1996).
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according to general rules. 87 Spanish jurisprudence on the application of
the L.O.T.J. has noted problems over compliance with this legal require-
ment on several occasions: it was once pointed out that, more than approx-
imately fifty percent of total verdicts were either poorly reasoned or
unreasoned.88
B. Restricted Competence ofJury Courts
The competence of jury courts has itself caused much discussion and
several opinions are proffered in the literature, 89 as well as in public institu-
tions,90 in support of several amendments. Such opinions agree in most
cases on the absence of coherence and proper relationships between the list
of crimes contained in Article 1(2), which, as jury provisions, have a histor-
ical parallel in Spain. 91 Different proposals have been cited, such as the
inclusion of offenses against sexual freedom and the elimination of the so-
called "bagatelle offenses," which cover failure to render aid, trespass in a
dwelling place, and especially associated threats with menaces. The latter
has led to several pieces of jurisprudence in application of the aforemen-
tioned "avoidance of jury trial." 92 A general criterion has also been added,
which excludes the sorts of offenses that require complex evidence. 93
87. See L.E. CRIM. arts. 847-909. An example is presented by Juan Montero Aroca in Ambito del
recurso de casacidn en el proceso especial ante el tribunal deljurado (con ocasian de la STS, sala 2a,
de 24 defebrero de 1998), 8-9 TRIBUNALES DE JUSTICIA 831 (1998).
88. See Manuel Serra Dominguez, El Jurado: dxito o fracaso, in PROBLEMAS ACTUALES DE LA
JUSTICIA PENAL 59, 62 (Joan Pic6 i Junoy ed., 2001).
89. See, e.g., Estrampes, supra note 18, at 433-34; Gimeno Sendra, supra note 29, at 420. For
further evaluation, see also Jestis Maria Gonzilez Garcia, Constitucian de 1978 yjusticia popular: siete
alios de tribunal de jurado, in MANUEL BALADO RUIZ-GALLEGOS & JOSE ANTONIO GARCIA
REGUEIRO, LA CONSTITUCON ESPAiOLA DE 1978 EN SU XXV ANIVERSARIO 933 (J. M.
Bosch ed., 2003).
90. See, e.g., FISCAL GENERAL DEL ESTADO, Memorias de la Fiscalia General del Estado, 1057,
available at http://www.fiscal.es/ficheros/memorias/484/1022/MEMFIS1Ocompleto-con-botones.pdf
(last visited Mar. 4, 2011) (stating that some Provincial Prosecution Offices, including Salamanca,
Toledo, and A Coruila, have proposed amendments to the L.O.T.J. in order to exclude some offenses
from the jury court's competence, such as those listed here).
91. Specifically, the 1820 Press Law as the first legal regulatory legislation of "judges of fact"
and, especially, the 1888 "Pacheco Law," which involved jury trials for all kinds of crimes, terrorism,
and economic fraud. See generally Jimeno-Bulnes, supra note 2, at 165-69.
92. The offense of threats with menaces may be qualified as either a crime or a misdemeanor
according to Articles 169-171 and 620 of the C.P., respectively. In this latter case, competence is
attributed not to the jury court but to the Investigative Judge according to Article 87(l)(c) of the
L.O.P.J. The exclusion of the offense of menaces from the jury's competence had been already sug-
gested by the C.G.P.D. 1998 REPORT, supra note 56, at 74.
93. This is the case of certain offenses against the public administration, for example, embezzle-
ment of public funds, fraud or illegal levies, or illegal negotiations by public officials; also, the offense
of arson in forestlands entails difficulties with regard to evidence, as very often no more than circums-
tantial evidence is available.
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The Preamble to the L.O.T.J. provides for the extension of the jury
court's competence to crimes other than those listed in Article 1 on the
basis of past experience and the consolidation of the jury institution.94 At
present, the competence of the jury court is regulated in Articles 1 and 5;
the latter includes interesting rules that extend the competence of the jury
courts to "related crimes," 95 with special provisions that differ from those
contemplated in the general rules (Article 17 of L.E. CRIM.). In sum, the
special rule contained in the L.O.T.J. applies vis expansiva to jury courts,
which attribute them with competence to try those related crimes when the
relationship is due to (a) simultaneity in the committal of the crimes by two
or more persons jointly, (b) agreement between several persons to commit
the same crimes in different places, and (c) committal of certain crimes
(secondary offenses) in order to incite the committal of other ones (princip-
al crimes) which are also executed. But further interpretations of this no-
tional relationship have restricted the possession of such vis attrativa by
jury courts, especially in cases known as "subjective related crimes." 96
One of these restrictive interpretations has been presented in jurispru-
dence pronounced by the Supreme Court, which in Spain acquires the role
of legal doctrine. After some contradictory decisions in favor of extending
the competence of the jury court to such "subjective related crimes," 97 and
one against such an extension, 98 an even more recent Agreement by the
94. L.O.T.J. pmbl. 1I, para. 4 ("El Ambito competencial correspondiente al Tribunal del Jurado se
fija en el articulo 1. Sin embargo, el legislador en el futuro valorara sin duda, a la vista de la experiencia
y de la consolidaci6n social de la instituci6n, la ampliaci6n progresiva de los delitos que han de ser
objeto de enjuiciamiento." ["The competence scope of the Jury Court is defined in article 1. Neverthe-
less, in view of the experience and the social consolidation of the institution, the legislator will, in the
future, undoubtedly support the progressive increase of the list of offenses that have to be tried."]).
95. See Eduardo de Urbano Castrillo, EL JURADO Y EL DELITO CONEXO, I LA LEY 2030
(1997); Juan F. Herrero Perezagua, La conexidn en el proceso ante el Jurado, I ACTUALIDAD PENAL 49
(1999). Also, more recently, Miguel Colmenero Men6ndez de Luarca, LA CONEXIDAD EN LA
COMPETENCIA DEL TRIBUNAL DEL JURADO, in JUICIO POR JURADO: EXPERIENCIA Y
REVISION, supra note 8, at 47, with reference to the jurisprudence pronounced by the Supreme Court,
Criminal Chamber number two; the criminal division in which the author acts as a magistrate.
96. See, e.g., El FISCAL GENERAL DEL ESTADO, CIRCULAR NUMERO 3/1995, de 27 de diciem-
bre, SOBRE EL PROCESO ANTE EL TRIBUNAL DEL JURADO: SU AMBITO DE APLICACION,
1099-1100
http://www.fiscal.es/cs/Satellite?buscador-0&c=Page&cid=1240559967917&codigo=FGE &language
=es&newPagina-31&pagename=PFiscal%2FPage%2FFGEbuscadorArchivoDocument (last visited
Mar. 4, 2011) (discussing the jury proceedings and their objective application, delivered by the Attor-
ney General).
97. E.g., S.T.S., Nov. 29, 2000 (R.G.D., No. 8726). In this case, the magistrate reporter was Jose
Antonio Martin Pallin, who is well known in Spanish literature on the judiciary as one of the supporters
of the jury institution. In this concrete case, the vis attractiva of the jury court was defended in relation
to cases that even differed from those explained in Article 5 of the L.O.T.J., inasmuch as more serious
crimes committed by the same person is attributed to jury court.
98. E.g., S.T.S., Oct. 5, 2000 (R.G.D., No. 7099). The Provincial Court at Burgos has upheld
identical criteria. For example, judgment number 56, of December 5, 2005, S.A.P., Dec. 5, 2005 (R.J.,
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Plenary of the Criminal Chamber on February 23, 2010,99 declared a com-
mon doctrine in order to restrict the competence of jury courts to related
crimes. The agreement encourages separate trials for such offenses when-
ever possible and establishes different rules to be followed in the interpreta-
tion of an objective and subjective relationship between different crimes. In
recent judgments, the Supreme Court has already applied the agreement;
nevertheless, some magistrates have expressed dissenting opinions that
have defended the competence of the jury court for the crime in ques-
tion.100 This last judicial practice shows how far removed this question is
from a peaceful resolution.
Finally, the enormous importance of the question should not be over-
looked, as the Jury Court is a recognized court of law equal to any other
professional judge or court, according to constitutional provisions con-
tained in Article 24(2) of the Spanish Constitution.' 0 The proclamation of
this fundamental right was envisaged in the Jurisprudential Decision of the
Constitutional Court number 147/1983, April 13, 1983102-although the
enactment of the L.O.T.J. in 1995 had yet to take place-and for this rea-
son, the defense appeal for trial by jury was dismissed. The Constitutional
Court declared at that time the obligation of the Spanish legislature to pro-
vide for the jury procedure on the basis of Article 125 of the Spanish Con-
stitution1 03 and, having done so, to establish the fundamental right to be
No. 788), attributed competence to the jury court to judge the embezzlement of public funds, and
competence to the Provincial Court to judge the forgery of public documents that would disrupt the
"cause's continence" and lead to contradictory judgments.
99. T.S., Feb. 23, 2010 (J.T.S., No. 142593). In contrast, it is not found on the official website of
the Supreme Court. In fact, the Plenary of the Criminal Chamber on February 5, 1999, reached an
agreement on the same topic, which has been quoted several times in various pieces of jurisprudence.
100. Eg., S.T.S., July 23, 2010 (R.G.D., No. 4955). Here, the dissenting opinion presented by Jose
Antonio Martin Pallin criticizes some of the rules in the previous agreement by the Plenary of the
Supreme Court, Criminal Chamber, which he considers fortuitous and uncertain.
101. C.E., B.O.E. n. 311, Dec. 29, 1978 ("all have the right to the ordinary judge predetermined by
law; to defense and assistance by a lawyer; to be informed of the charges brought against them; to a
public trial without undue delays and with full guarantees; to the use of evidence appropriate to their
defense; not to make self-incriminating statements; not to plead themselves guilty; and to be presumed
innocent"). The right to the lawful judge forms part of the content to the due process of law contem-
plated in this whole provision and, as a kind of a fundamental right, allows the defense to raise an
appeal before the Constitutional Court, as previously explained. For extensive treatment of the topic,
see MARIA LUISA ESCALADA LOPEz, SOBRE EL JUEZ ORDINARIO PREDETERMINADO POR LA
LEY (2007). In relation with the jury court, see Jose Augusto de Vega Ruiz, EL JURADO Y EL JUEZ
ORDINARIO Y PREDETERMINADO POR LA LEY, 3 LA LEY 899 (1989).
102. T.C., Apr. 13, 1983 (B.J.C., No. 147), available at
http://www.boe.es/aeboe/consultas/basesdatos/doc.php?coleccion=tc&id=AUTO-1983-0147.
103. At that time, there was also great controversy surrounding the thesis of an "obligatory
mandate" in reference to the interpretation of Article 125 of the Spanish Constitution. See Jimeno-
Bulnes, supra note 2, at 169-70.
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judged by a jury court as provided for by law.104 For this reason, further
jurisprudence was pronounced by the Supreme Court as well as by the
Constitutional Court to clarify the issue that relates to the infringement of
such fundamental rights to trial by jury and the competence of the jury
court to extend to related crimes according to the rules in Article 5 of the
L.O.T.J. 05 However, most of this jurisprudence rejects the complaints of
the defense and declares the non-violation of this fundamental right despite
the legal certitude over the attribution of the jury court's competence be-
cause they involve well-known, televised cases, such as the Fago crime,106
or the case of Marta del Castillo, 07 which is still in progress.
104. T.C., Apr. 13, 1983 (B.J.C., No. 147), available at
http://www.boe.es/aeboe/consultas/basesdatos/doc.php?coleccion-tc&id=AUTO-1983-0147 ("En
conclusi6n, de acuerdo con el art. 125 de la Constituci6n, existe una obligaci6n para el legislador de
crear el jurados. Una vez creado, y dado que el art. 24.2 de la Constituci6n reconoce el derecho al Juez
ordinario predeterminado por la Ley, el mencionado derecho fundamental comprender el derecho a ser
enjuiciado por un jurado en la medida en que la Ley a que remite asi lo prevea cuando se promulgue, y
con el alcance que corresponda a la intervenci6n del jurados." ["In conclusion, in accordance with art.
125 of the Constitution, the legislator has an obligation to establish the juries. Once established, and
given that art. 24.2 of the Constitution acknowledges the right of the ordinary Judge predetermined by
Law, the aforementioned fundamental right will include the right to be tried by a jury insofar as the law
to which it refers envisages this when it is enacted and within the limits that correspond to the tasks of
the jury."]).
105. Arguments between both courts are sometimes contradictory on this topic and even in the
same Supreme Court; hence, the pronouncement of the aforementioned Agreement on February 23,
2010. See, e.g., S.T.S., Sept. 29, 2010 (R.G.D., No. 5290); S.T.S., June 26, 2009 (R.G.D., No. 3938);
S.T.C., Feb. 27, 2007 (S.T.C., No. 156), available at
http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/es/jurisprudencia/Paginas/Auto.aspx?cod=8748; A.T.S., Jan. 20,
2004 (R.G.D., No. 70).
106. See S.T.S., Sept. 29, 2010 (R.G.D., No. 5290). Fago's crime took place in a small village
located in the Pyrinde, where the major was assassinated by a neighbor, according to the conviction
declared by the Provincial Court of Huesca instead of the correspondent jury court. For this reason,
there was an allegation of the infringement of lawful judge before the Supreme Court. But the Supreme
Court decision declared that there was no violation of the competence rules as far as the "related
crimes" competence rules according to Article 5 of the L.O.T.J. were applied. Precisely, in provision of
such decision for present case, the pronouncement of the Agreement by the Plenary of the Criminal
Chamber took place on February 23, 2010. Another important reason for such jurisprudence in this case
was the enormous influence of the mass media and the possible danger for jury bias, although the bias
of the professional judge was also alleged before the Supreme Court. In fact, there was a well-known
television series promoted by the public television channel in Spain (TVE) relating the real facts with
fiction personages.
107. See Caso eMarta del Castillo>>: Auto que declara la competencia de la Audiencia Provincial
en detrimento del Tribunal del Jurado para el enjuiciamiento de la causa, DIARIO LA LEY, Dec. 27,
2010 (n. 7535). An order by Provincial Court at Seville on August 13, 2010, applying a previous Su-
preme Court Agreement of February 23, 2010, declared the competence of the Provincial Court instead
of the respective jury court in spite of the case, which involved the murder of Marta del Castillo. The
argument employed was that the murder was committed to cover up a rape, which figured among the
offenses excluded from the competence of the jury court according to the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of Article 5 of the L.O.T.J. contained in the aforementioned Agreement. As many people in the city
demonstrated solidarity towards Marta and lent public support to her family, this case also had a big
impact in the mass media.
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C. Settlement ofParticular Agreements Between the Accused and the
Prosecution
Another illustrative example of the phenomenon known as "avoidance
of the jury trial," according to reports of the General Council of Judiciary
Branch,' 08 takes place when particular agreements are made between the
accused and the prosecutor or prosecutors. In fact, this mechanism
represents a sort of plea bargaining and the pronouncement of a "conformi-
ty sentence." According to Article 50(1) of the L.O.T.J., this agreement or
conformidad in jury proceedings is only legally provided once the jury trial
has begun, as explained above, with a general rule109 limiting it to offenses
punishable by no more than a six-year prison term. However, on some oc-
casions the consensus reached between the prosecution (public, private, or
popular) and the accused with regard to the plea or "conformity" is reached
before the beginning of the jury trial. It can even happen before the selec-
tion of the jury in the pretrial procedure or "intermediate phase." In short,
an agreement with the offer from the prosecution is presented in the de-
fense writ (escrito de defensa) by the defense lawyer and is then ratified by
the accused before the magistrate-president.Il 0
The arguments employed for such judicial practice vary; some are
laudable even though they do not always comply with written law, which
should be amended in this context.II In sum, the legal arguments refer to
the analogical application of Article 50 of the L.O.T.J. and to the subsidiary
of the general rule provided in Article 655 of L.E. CRIM.,11 2 which is appli-
cable in ordinary criminal proceedings."13 The latter contemplates the con-
formity institution before the beginning of an oral hearing. Economic
108. C.G.P.D. 1999 REPORT, supra note 56; C.G.P.D. 1998 REPORT, supra note 56.
109. Article 655 and, more specifically, Article 787(1) of the L.E. CRiM. provide for abbreviated
proceedings. The rules in the latter article only allow for the conformity institution as a variation of the
ordinary proceeding. The reason is due to the legally stipulated competence limits for each one. Accord-
ing to Article 757 of the L.E. CRiM., abbreviated rules are indicated with regard to crimes for which the
punishment is not in excess of nine years imprisonment or of a dififerent nature. Otherwise, the rules of
ordinary proceeding will be applied for serious crimes.
110. See L.O.T.J. art. 29(2). The preliminary hearing may be waived pursuant to Article 30(2) of
the L.O.T.J. See Estrampes, supra note 18, at 452-53.
111. Manuel Miranda Estrampes, a public prosecutor, has argued that legal conformity should be
substituted by this judicial practice in order to allow conformity before the jury trial and then the consti-
tution of the jury panel. Estrampes, supra note 18, at 452-54.
112. See L.O.T.J. arts. 24(2), 29. Note that Article 29 of the L.O.T.J. refers to only Articles 650,
652, and 653, but not Article 655, of the L.E. CRIM. They usually refer to the last article inasmuch as
Article 652 of the L.E. CRIM. makes reference to the possibility that the accused person or persons may
show their "agreement" (esidn conformes) with pleas contained in prosecution writs. Ordinary signific-
ance of the Spanish term conforme is applied in this case to the conformity institution.
113. The only proceedings where the conformity institution can take place according to the legal
competence limits. See L.E. CRIM. art. 787(1); supra note 109.
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arguments are also presented. In this context, it is considered "ridiculous"
and "costly" to open a jury selection process and hold a jury trial when
there is no need for the jury court to pronounce a verdict, and the judgment
has already been ratified in the agreement between the prosecution and the
accused.
One of the Provincial Courts to pioneer this judicial practice is the
Provincial Court of Asturias. Some of its decisions in 1996, 1997, and 1998
had already defined this position under the name of "conformity" (confor-
midad). One example is judgment number 68/1998, February 6, 1998,114
which was in relation to the offense of trespass in a dwelling place. The
two accused and their defense counsel expressed agreement with this
charge and the penalty offered by the prosecutor; an agreement or "con-
formity" was submitted to the Investigative Judge and to the magistrate-
president of the Jury Court, who pronounced the conformity sentence. Thus
there was no need for either a jury trial or the selection of the jury panel.
The Provincial Court in Barcelona pronounced similar jurisprudence
around the same time, in 1996, and later on. Its opinions were upheld by
the Regional Supreme Court in Catalonia, in resolution of some appeals on
this cause. Specifically, judgment number 11/1998, September 10, 1998,
pronounced by the Regional Supreme Court of Catalonia (Civil and Crimi-
nal Chamber), 115 employs the above-mentioned arguments, in order to
declare that the conformity institution may be applied to the jury trial and
the selection of the jury process. The decision implicitly considers the exis-
tence of a legal loophole not covered by law and argues that the L.O.T.J.
only provides for the so-called "outcome conformity" (conformidad de
desenlace), hence the need for an analogical interpretation of the above-
mentioned legal rules. An interesting case concerned a successful appeal of
an the acquittal handed down by the Provincial Court of Barcelona; instead
of the conviction which had been agreed upon, the Catalan Supreme Court
declared the decision contradictory and referred to the binding nature of the
conformity institution. 116
Finally, this jurisprudence is increasingly used by current Provincial
Courts in Spain, especially over recent years. Judgments arising from
agreements that are based on this doctrine have been pronounced by the
114. S.A.P., Feb. 6, 1998 (R.J., No. 841). References to previous jurisprudence by the same court,
such as the judgments of December 19, 1996, Section Two, and of April 24, 1997, Section Three, are
indicated here.
115. S.T.S., Sept. 10, 1998 (R.J., No. 3942). The reference to the Provincial Court of Barcelona's
previous jurisprudence is pointed out, such as the judgments of May 20 and June 11, 1996, as well as of
February 24, April 11, May 20, June 18, and July 16, 1997.
116. S.T.S., Sept. 20, 1998 (R.J., No. 3942).
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Provincial Courts of Guipfizcoa,1 17 Lugo,11 8 Madrid,119 Cantabria,120 Tar-
ragona, 121 Valladolid,122 Ciudad Real, 123 and Pontevedra.124 The Provin-
cial Court of Burgos has also developed these arguments in several
decisions, such as judgment number 6/2006, February 22, 2006,125 and,
more recently, decision numbers 12/2009, March 6, 2009,126 and 53/2010,
September 24, 2010.127 The same approach was followed in a well-known
case in Burgos due to media attention under the title of "Tania's crime," in
which Tania's friend, an immigrant worker like the victim, mounted a pop-
ular accusation, along with the public prosecution; both prosecutors and
accused agreed on fourteen years imprisonment, which appeared in the
judgment pronounced by the magistrate-president on November 24,
117. S.A.P., Mar. 29, 2000 (R.J., No. 117). In this case, the accused agreed with the plea from the
public prosecution, who requested six months imprisonment as well as suspension of passive suffrage
rights and medical treatment throughout the conviction because of conditional threats offense, accord-
ing to Articles 169(1) of the C.P., as well as Articles 20(1) and 21(1) of the C.P.
118. S.A.P., Feb. 9, 2001 (R.J., No. 244). Here, the agreement between the accused and the public
prosecutor took place in order to accept a conviction in exchange for three years and nine months'
imprisonment in a psychiatric hospital because of the murder, according to Article 138 of the C.P., and
the mental illness of the accused operating as an incomplete exemption, as in Articles 20(1) and 21(1)
of the C.P.
119. S.A.P., Nov. 29, 2002 (J.T.S., No. 92159); S.A.P., May 3, 2004 (J.T.S., No. 228205). In both
cases, the accused was convicted of trespass in a dwelling place under Article 202(1) of the C.P. and a
punishment of three months imprisonment was agreed upon.
120. S.T.S., Oct. 8, 2009 (J.T.S., No. 469157); S.A.P., Jan. 23, 2006 (J.T.S., No. 135298); S.A.P.,
Dec. 12, 2002 (J.T.S., No. 66957). In the first and third cases, the offense consisted of arson in forest-
lands under Articles 352 and 353 of the C.P. punished with a year of imprisonment and the imposition
of a fine throughout twelve months and the suspension of passive voting right. The offense in the
second case was qualified as menaces under Article 169(1) of the C.P. and punishable by a prison term
of six months with the suspension of voting rights.
121. S.A.P., Feb. 4, 2004 (J.T.S., No. 91603). The accused was fined six months with a daily 62.40
quota for embezzlement of public funds, an offense defined in Article 433 of the C.P.
122. S.A.P., Dec. 11, 2003 (J.T.S., No. 78047). The offense here was also against the public admin-
istration, this time consisting of bribery defined in Articles 421 and 423(1) of the C.P.; the accused
received a 6200 fine.
123. S.A.P., May 3, 2007 (J.T.S., No. 283150). Both accused were convicted of trespass in a dwel-
ling place, as defined in Article 202(1) of the C.P., and punished six months imprisonment and the
suspension of voting rights for a similar period.
124. S.A.P., Jan. 14, 2009 (J.T.S., No. 263555). The accused was convicted of failing to render aid
to a person run over by his vehicle under Article 195(1), (3) of the C.P. and was condemned to six
months imprisonment.
125. S.A.P., Feb. 22, 2006 (J.T.S., No. 111296). Here the defendant who was accused of murder
under Article 138(1) of the C.P. was finally released because of the application of the exemption clause
contained in Article 20(1) of the C.P. under the title of "psychic abnormality," hence the application of
the security measure consisting of confinement in a psychiatric hospital for fifteen years.
126. S.A.P., Mar. 6, 2009 (J.T.S., No. 261540). The offense consisted of continuous threats with
menaces under Article 169(1) of the C.P., punishment for which was established at two years impri-
sonment under Article 74 of the C.P. and the suspension of voting rights for a similar period.
127. S.A.P., Sept. 24, 2010 (J.T.S., No. 348617). The accused was convicted of homicide under
Article 138 of the C.P. and assassination under Article 139 of the C.P., for which she was condemned to
thirteen years and to eighteen years imprisonment, respectively, with total disability in both cases for
the murder of her mother and three-year-old child.
608 [Vol 86:2
JURY SELECTION AND JURY TRIAL IN SPAIN
2010.128 These events occurred two days after the day fixed for the selec-
tion of the jury panel and the start of the jury trial, neither of which took
place. The magistrate-president presented his excuses, justification, and
gratitude to the twenty-nine prospective jurors for their attendance.129
CONCLUSION
Having read through this description of the key institutional and pro-
cedural features of Spain's jury system and, especially, those points that
relate to the jury selection process and jury proceedings, it is clear that the
theoretical rules do not always mirror judicial practice. Two examples have
been presented in relation to the judicial practice that the Supreme Court
dubbed the "avoidance of jury trial," according to reports drafted by the
General Council of Judiciary Branch: 130 the restriction of the competence
of jury courts to related crimes when their judgment can take place sepa-
rately, and the introduction of the "conformity institution" or "plea bargain-
ing" before the selection of the jury and the start of the trial, as abbreviated
proceedings are always possible.131
Indeed, for these reasons, the impact of jury proceedings in Spain is
still more limited and symbolic than it should be according to legal rules
and the competence of jury courts is also restricted to certain offenses. One
needs to do no more than compare the number of criminal cases tried in
Jury Courts in application of the L.O.T.J. with the total number of cases
tried in the Criminal or Provincial Courts according to the ordinary or ab-
breviated procedural rules: 132 there were 269 jury trials in 2008, compared
to 138,948 abbreviated proceedings and 3,342 ordinary proceedings, in
addition to the 141,519 urgent diligences or fast-track procedures con-
ducted by the Investigative Judges on custody (Juzgados de guardia).133
128. Judgment n. 65/2010, not yet reported and delivered in Jury Proceeding n. 2/2009, whose Jury
selection file n. 303/2010 was commented on above.
129. November 22, 2010, at 9:30 am. My gratitude again to Jos6 Luis Gallo Hidalgo, Clerk of the
Provincial Court at Burgos, for facilitating my presence at the sessions to select the jury panel, a proce-
dure that takes place with the exclusive assistance of the Clerk of the Court and parties under Article 38
of the L.O.T.J.
130. C.G.P.D. 1999 REPORT, supra note 56; C.G.P.D. 1998 REPORT, supra note 56.
131. See supra notes 109 and 113.
132. There is no coincidence between the competence of the Criminal or Provincial Courts and the
employment of abbreviated or ordinary proceeding rules. The former are competent to judge offenses
punishable by up to five years imprisonment and the latter judge crimes over this limit according to
general rules provided for in Article 14 of the L.E. CRIM. In contrast, Article 757 of the L.E. CRIM.
provides for the application of rules on fast-track or ordinary proceedings for offenses punishable by up
to nine years imprisonment. See supra note 109.
133. See L.E. CRIM. arts. 797-99. They take place in a different kind of ordinary proceedings called
"fast-track proceedings for certain offenses" (procedimiento para el enjuiciamiento rdpido de determi-
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An imparity that increased in 2009, when 250 jury proceedings took place
compared to 145,710 abbreviated proceedings, 3,291 ordinary proceedings,
and 159,721 fast-track procedures, according to statistics provided by the
Office of the Attorney General.13 4
Many arguments both for and against retaining the jury institution in
Spain have been presented by its supporters and detractors. Another rele-
vant factor is the reluctance of the public to act as jurors for several reasons
(economic,135 apprehension, and even fearl 36), which should be borne in
mind along with more prosaic considerations. The Supreme Court has ar-
gued that juries waste time and resources in several of its decisions. After
fifteen years of functioning, it is perhaps time to propose some of the
amendments to the L.O.T.J. that have been discussed in this Article, in
order to strengthen legal support for this judicial practice. Otherwise, Span-
ish judges and courts may indeed surpass their constitutional role contem-
plated in Article 117(3) of the Spanish Constitution, 37 inasmuch as the
continental civil law system solely applies the law,138 but is not meant to
nados delitos) with their own legal provisions, for offenses of minor importance and light sanctions,
such as traffic offenses, security, larceny and petty theft, etc.; certain other legal prescriptions are also
required. These proceedings are regulated in Articles 795-803 of the L.E. CRIM. and can take place
before the Investigative Judges under legal rules when the conformity institution is operative; other-
wise, an oral hearing will take place in a Criminal Court under the abbreviated proceedings rule.
134. This according to statistics provided by the Office of the Attorney General. See EL FISCAL
GENERAL DEL ESTADO, Memorias 2009: Datos Compendiados a Escala Nacional, 1310-11,
http://www.fiscal.es/ficheros/memorias/202/572/08_v2c2compendiados.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2011);
EL FISCAL GENERAL DEL ESTADO, Memorias 2010: Evolucion en el Orden Cuantitativo de los Proce-
dimientos Iniciados, 219-20,
http://www.fiscal.es/cs/Satellite?cid=1247140094968&language=es&pagename=PFiscal%2FPage%2F
FGEcontenidoFinal (last visited Mar. 4, 2011). Also, the General Council of the Judiciary Branch
publishes its own statistics in English. See GENERAL COUNCIL OF THE JUDICIARY, THE SPANISH
JUSTICE SYSTEM: ALL THE FACTS 2009, available at
http://www.poderjudicial.es/eversuite/GetDoc?DBName=dPortal&UniqueKeyValue=1 53965&Downlo
ad=false&ShowPath=false.
135. See Jos6 Juan Toharia, Los espailoles ante el juicio con Jurado, 45-46 DOCUMENTACI6N
JURIDICA 285, 285 (1985); Jost JUAN TOHARIA, ACTITUDES DE LOS ESPANOLES ANTE LA
ADMINISTRACION DE JUSTICIA 29 (1994).
136. Specifically, Carlos Fidalgo Gallardo, LA INTIMIDACIN DE LOS JURADOS, 1-2 JUSTICIA
171 (1998).
137. Textually, "The exercise of judicial authority in any kind of action, both in ruling and having
judgments executed, is vested exclusively in the courts and tribunals laid down by the law, in accor-
dance with the rules of jurisdiction and procedure which may be established therein." C.E., B.O.E. n.
311, Dec. 29, 1978).
138. Recalling the words of Montesquieu, "la bouche qui prononce les paroles de la loi; des 8tres
inanim6s qui n'en peuvent moddrer ni la force ni la rigueur" as the latter is the task of the legislature.
Charles de Secondat, De I'esprit des lois (1748), translated in THOMAS NUGENT, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS
180 (2001), available at http://www.efm.bris.ac.uk/het/montesquieu/spiritoflaws.pdf (last visited Mar.
4, 2011) (translated as "the national judges are no more than the mouth that pronounces the words of the
law, mere passive beings, incapable of moderating either its force or rigour"). In Spain, see comments
by ERNESTO PEDRAZ PENALVA, Lajurisdicci6n en la teoria de la divisidn de poderes de Montesquieu,
in CONSTITUCI6N, JURISDICClON Y PROCESO, supra note 7, at 30.
610 [Vol 86:2
2011] JURY SELECTION AND JURY TRIAL IN SPAIN 611
create new precedent-based law, as is the case in countries with a common
law tradition.

